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TAXING ENDOWMENT
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INTRODUCTION
Writing in 1888, Francis A. Walker, the first president of the
American Economic Association, claimed that the ideal tax base was
neither wealth, nor income, nor consumption, but rather “faculty, or
native or acquired power of production.”1 According to Walker, only
this tax base—what people could earn, rather than the often lesser
amounts they actually earn—could achieve an equitable distribution
of the tax burden:
We must, I think, conclude that . . . to tax revenue instead of faculty
is to put a premium upon self-indulgence in the form of indolence,
the waste of opportunities, the abuse of natural powers; and that a
faculty tax constitutes the only theoretically just form of taxation,
men being required to serve the state in the degree in which they
2
have ability to serve themselves.

Although he conceded that practical difficulties made adoption of a
pristine faculty tax impossible, he urged that it should nevertheless be
“held in view, as furnishing the line from which to measure all
departures from the equities of contribution, as one or another form
of taxation . . . comes to be adopted for meeting the wants of
government.”3

Copyright © 2006 by Lawrence Zelenak.
† Pamela B. Gann Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. Francis A. Walker, The Bases of Taxation, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 14 (1888).
2. Id. at 15.
3. Id. at 16.
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Writing almost a century later, the economist David Bradford
4
reached a similar conclusion. According to Bradford, tax burdens
should be sensitive to differences in people’s opportunities, but not
sensitive to the different choices they might make. Ideally, each
person would be subject to a one-time tax, at the beginning of his
working years, on the present value of “his initial endowment of
5
financial wealth and of future earning power.” A tax imposed
annually rather than once in a lifetime could approximate the effects
of the single tax, if (1) financial wealth was subject to a consumption
tax rather than an income tax,6 and (2) people were taxed on each
year’s potential labor earnings, rather than on their actual labor
earnings.7 For Bradford, the practical policy significance of the
endowment tax ideal related to the first point—that a consumption
tax was superior to an income tax because it more closely approached
the endowment ideal.8 As a theoretical matter, however, he also
insisted on the desirability of taxing potential earnings. In support of
his claim, he posited a professional football quarterback and an
individual without any high wage skills. Ideally the quarterback
should be taxed more heavily than the nonathlete, because of his
better opportunities, even if the nonathlete actually earns more
money:
It might be that the nonathlete works very hard at a menial job and
manages to earn more than the athlete, who chooses to work only
on Saturday [sic] afternoons. If the athlete has the option of doing
the same thing as the nonathlete but in addition has the opportunity
to earn a high reward as a quarterback, the fact that he chooses to
use the better opportunity in part to enjoy more leisure does not

4. DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC
TAX REFORM 36 (2d ed. 1984).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 36–38; DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 162–66 (1986).
7. BRADFORD, supra note 6, at 154–56.
8. “A consumption tax amounts to a tax on lifetime endowment. . . . An income tax will
tend to assess tax burdens in a way presumably correlated with lifetime wealth, but because it
depends upon matters of timing, the correspondence is nowhere near as close as . . . under a
consumption base tax.” BRADFORD & U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, supra note 4, at 39.
If two people begin life with the same financial wealth, but one consumes the wealth
immediately, while the other saves and invests it to finance greater future consumption, an
annual consumption tax will mirror the effects of a one-time tax on financial endowment, in that
both the consumption tax and the endowment tax will impose equal burdens on the two persons
(in present value terms). By contrast, an income tax will impose a heavier burden on the saver.
BRADFORD, supra note 6, at 163.
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alter the conclusion that his opportunities are better or the
9
theoretical case for assigning him the larger burden.

Generalizing the point, Bradford explained, “What one might like to
have is a tax based on an individual’s potential earnings: the
10
individual’s tax would then be unrelated to his choice of what to do.”
Only the unfortunate inability of the tax administrator to observe
potential earnings dissuaded Bradford from actually advocating such
a tax.11
Despite the longstanding and understandable lack of
congressional interest in taxing unexercised earning capacity, the idea
of endowment taxation—in the sense of a tax based on potential
rather than actual earnings—has attracted increasing attention in
recent years from economists, philosophers, and academic tax
lawyers. The dialogue among academic tax lawyers is especially lively
at the moment, with important recent contributions by Daniel
12
13
14
Shaviro, Kirk Stark, and David Hasen. With endowment taxation
being addressed from several disciplinary frameworks, and with most
15
contributions focusing on only one or a few aspects of the topic, it is
not easy for a reader to grasp all the scholarly threads relevant to
endowment tax analysis. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that
some recent articles with important implications for endowment
taxation have not been identified by their authors as contributions to
the endowment tax literature,16 and so have gone unnoticed by those
who are explicitly pondering endowment taxation.

9. BRADFORD, supra note 6, at 154.
10. Id. at 156.
11. Id.
12. Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE: THE ONGOING DEBATE
123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002).
13. Kirk J. Stark, Enslaving the Beachcomber: Some Thoughts on the Liberty Objection to
Endowment Taxation, 18 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 47 (2005).
14. David Hasen, The Illiberality of Human Endowment Taxation (Aug. 10, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=779545 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006)).
15. The discussion in Shaviro, supra note 12, is perhaps the widest ranging in the literature.
At least five significant contributions to the literature postdate Shaviro’s work, however, and
thus are not considered by him. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF
OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing
Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003); Daniel
Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J. 2291 (2003); Stark,
supra note 13; Hasen, supra note 14.
16. E.g., Terrence Chorvat, Taxing Utility, 35 J. SOCIO-ECON. 1 (2006); Logue & Avraham,
supra note 15; Markovits, supra note 15.
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The aim of this review Essay is to provide a reasonably
comprehensive critical guide to the state of the endowment tax
discussion. Because the utilitarian arguments for and against
endowment taxation are quite different from the liberal egalitarian
arguments, this Essay considers the merits of endowment taxation
from both perspectives. Part I explains that an endowment tax base
has no inherent normative significance for a utilitarian—that is,
endowment is not necessarily the very thing a utilitarian would want
to tax in an ideal world. On the other hand, if it were practical to
measure endowment, a utilitarian might support an endowment tax
out of a belief that it would produce a higher sum of individuals’
utilities than any other tax system (because it could accomplish
utility-enhancing redistribution with minimal inefficiency costs).
Finally, however, the strange distributional effects of a utilitymaximizing endowment tax—the fact that after-tax utility is inversely
related to ability in such a system—may cause some to reconsider
their philosophical commitment to utilitarianism.
Part II considers the liberal egalitarian responses to endowment
taxation. It is considerably longer than Part I, because the liberal
egalitarian analysis of endowment taxation is (frankly) more
interesting than the utilitarian analysis, and because the scholarly
development of the liberal egalitarian concerns has been more
extensive than the development of the utilitarian concerns. In
general, liberal egalitarians would find an endowment tax attractive
for reasons congenial to Walker and Bradford—because of its
potential for redistributing on the basis of differences in brute luck
without also redistributing on the basis of differences in choices—but
for the risk of talent slavery posed by endowment taxation. The talent
slavery concern is that a person who could earn a very high wage, but
only by working full time at a job he despises, may be forced into that
hated employment by the need to pay the tax. After evaluating the
merits of the talent slavery objection, this Essay considers various
ways an endowment tax might be circumscribed or the definition of
endowment might be revised, so that the threat of talent slavery
would be reduced or eliminated. In the process, this Essay examines
ways in which a narrow focus on potential earnings may disregard
important differences in the true endowments (or net brute luck) of
different persons. Finally, Part II describes and evaluates the claim
that the basic premise of endowment taxation is “distinctly illiberal,”
entirely apart from concerns about talent slavery.
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Part III turns to some practical implications of endowment tax
theory. Endowment taxation—perhaps with endowment not defined
solely on the basis of potential earnings—would have much to
commend it, if the problems of measurement and talent slavery could
be overcome. The question thus arises whether some modest steps
could and should be taken in the direction of endowment taxation—
slouching toward an endowment tax—if those steps would not
implicate either of the problems associated with a full-fledged
endowment tax. This Essay describes and evaluates several proposals
for partial implementation of endowment taxation. It also suggests
that several aspects of current law—both within and outside the
Internal Revenue Code—can plausibly be viewed as instances of
limited endowment taxation. This Essay concludes that, although
Congress will not and should not enact a full-fledged endowment tax,
endowment tax principles can usefully inform tax policy analyses,
especially if the concept of endowment is broadened from the usual
narrow focus on earnings potential.
I. UTILITARIANISM AND ENDOWMENT TAXATION
A classic utilitarian’s goal in designing a tax-and-transfer system
is to maximize the sum of individuals’ utilities. If the base of the tax is
to be income, the crucial question is how best to balance the utility
gains from redistribution of income from higher-income to lowerincome persons (on the assumption that income has declining
marginal utility) against the utility losses from the substitution effects
of the tax.17 Substitution effects result when taxpayers change their
behavior to avoid a tax, substituting untaxed (or less heavily taxed)
behavior for the taxed behavior. Suppose, for example, that a
taxpayer’s wage rate is $100 per hour, that his marginal income tax
rate is 30 percent, that he values leisure time (at the margin) at $80
per hour, and that he is deciding whether to spend the next hour
working or at leisure. In the absence of tax, he would choose to work,
because he values his leisure at less than his $100 wage rate. In the

17. How to achieve this goal, under various assumed conditions, is the subject of optimal
income tax analysis. See generally MATTI TUOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND
REDISTRIBUTION (1990) (a comprehensive monograph on optimal income taxation); J.A.
Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175
(1971) (the seminal work in the field); Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the
Graduated Income Tax Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51, 51–62 (1999) (a
nontechnical introduction to optimal income tax analysis).
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presence of the income tax, however, he will choose $80 of untaxed
leisure over $70 of after-tax income. He views the $30 tax that would
be imposed on his work as a positive externality—a benefit to society
but not to him, which he disregards in making his labor supply
decision. The result of the substitution effect in this example is a
deadweight loss of $20—the difference between the $100 value of his
work and the $80 value of his leisure.
If it were possible to replace the income tax with a tax on
potential earnings—that is, an endowment tax—the utility gains from
redistribution could be achieved without the deadweight loss
associated with an income tax. The taxpayer would have no tax
incentive to substitute leisure for labor because his tax liability would
18
be unaffected by the amount he actually earns. A head tax—a tax
imposed in an equal dollar amount on each person—would also avoid
the deadweight loss of the substitution effect, but it could not achieve
the utility gains from redistribution possible with an endowment tax.
At first glance, then, it seems that an endowment tax would be the
choice of a utilitarian, if the tax administrator is able to observe
potential wage rates. Upon closer examination, however, the
utilitarian case for an endowment tax becomes shaky, even on the
heroic assumption that potential earnings are observable.
First, the conventional wisdom that head taxes and endowment
taxes have no substitution effects may not be quite right. In a recent
article, Terrence Chorvat claims that the fact that head taxes and
endowment taxes must be paid in cash means the taxes are less than
perfectly efficient: “While lump-sum taxes are commonly argued to
be perfectly non-distortive, we can see that such taxes can distort
relative prices between monetary and non-monetary goods, due to
[their] requirement that [they] be paid in money. Therefore, even a
19
lump-sum tax has deadweight loss.” To make the point more
concrete, suppose a particular person with a high wage rate would
choose, in the absence of any tax, to spend all his time as a
beachcomber—because he hates the work that would produce the
high wage, because he loves beachcombing, or both. If he is subject to
a high endowment tax based on his potential earnings, and if he can
earn the high wage only by working full time (i.e., the labor market is
very “lumpy” in his case), then he has two choices: he can work full
18. For statements that an endowment tax has no substitution effect, and therefore no
deadweight loss, see Stark, supra note 13, at 54, and Hasen, supra note 14, at 8.
19. Chorvat, supra note 16, at 6.
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time at the hated job and pay the tax in cash, or he can decline to
work and be imprisoned. The latter choice can be viewed as an inkind tax, equal to 100 percent of his time, if he insists on not fully
exploiting his earning potential. If, faced with these choices, he
understandably chooses to work at the hated job, the change in
behavior can be understood as a substitution effect of the in-kind tax,
with resultant deadweight loss. As in standard accounts of
substitution effects, he has changed his behavior to avoid the heavy
tax imposed on refusing to work.20 Although this means that an
endowment tax does not achieve efficiency nirvana, the substitution
effects of an endowment tax are certainly less significant than those of
an income tax. Thus endowment taxation should continue to be
attractive to utilitarians as far as deadweight loss is concerned.
The next question for a utilitarian pondering an endowment tax
is whether transfers of cash from persons with higher potential
earnings to those with lower potential earnings are necessarily utility
enhancing (setting aside questions of deadweight loss). In the context
of an income tax, utilitarians are generally willing to make the
assumptions about interpersonal comparisons of utility necessary to
conclude that taking money from a person with more income and
transferring it to a person with less income benefits the lower-income
person more than it hurts the higher-income person. Is it also
reasonable to conclude that redistribution of cash based on earnings
potential improves overall utility, because a person with higher
potential earnings has a lower marginal utility of cash than does a
person with lower potential earnings? That conclusion would be
reasonable, if having a higher wage rate is associated with having
21
higher earned income. On the other hand, if people differ in respects
other than their wage rates—in particular if they differ with respect to
their degree of work aversion (disutility of labor) or materialism
(utility derived from purchased consumption), or both—then taking
money from those with higher wage rates to finance transfers to those
with lower wage rates does not necessarily increase the sum of

20. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1919–21 (1987) (explaining the
substitution effect of an income tax, which is a “change in the willingness of individuals to
sacrifice leisure for consumption”).
21. See Shaviro, supra note 12, at 137 (arguing that redistribution on the basis of
endowment is utility enhancing, assuming a higher wage rate results in higher earnings); Stark,
supra note 13, at 54 (same).

02__ZELENAK.DOC

1152

10/13/2006 8:49 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1145

22
individuals’ utilities. Imposing a heavy endowment tax on a person
who can earn a high wage only by working at a job he hates may
cause a massive utility loss for that person, especially if the labor
market is lumpy (so that he must work full time at the high-wage job
or not at all).23 This is the talent slavery scenario, which is at the heart
of most liberal egalitarians’ objections to endowment taxation.24 The
common liberal egalitarian response is to reject an endowment tax if
it would result in talent slavery of even one person, regardless of how
attractive the tax might be in all other respects. A utilitarian, by
contrast, might be willing to accept a system producing talent slavery
for a few persons, if their utility losses were outweighed by the utility
gains the system produced for others.25
In sum, the utilitarian view of endowment taxation is rather
complicated. An endowment tax would be the utilitarian ideal if
people were identical in all respects other than their earnings
capacities. On the other hand, as Daniel Shaviro remarks, utilitarians
would find “no clear justification for imposing a straightforward
endowment tax, even if we could measure endowment. . . . once we
allow for taste differences and lumpy labor markets.”26 Finally, if
endowments were measurable but other differences (in work aversion
and materialism) were not, a utilitarian might conclude that the net
effects of an endowment tax—redistribution of cash mostly in utilityenhancing directions, with much less deadweight loss than an income
tax—were superior to the results achievable under any other tax
system.27
It may be, however, that when push comes to shove there are few
utilitarians. Several decades ago, James Mirrlees considered the
design of the utility-maximizing endowment tax-and-transfer system,
assuming the tax administrator could observe wage rates and that

22. See Shaviro, supra note 12, at 137–40 (noting that the results may change if one takes
these individual preferences into account); Stark, supra note 13, at 54–55 (same).
23. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 138.
24. On the talent slavery concerns of liberal egalitarians, see infra text accompanying notes
33–43.
25. The willingness of utilitarians to make tradeoffs of this sort is the object of John
Rawls’s criticism that utilitarianism “does not take seriously the distinction between persons.”
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971).
26. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 139.
27. Shaviro and Stark reach similar conclusions. See Shaviro, supra note 12, at 140
(concluding that endowment is a better tool for measuring inequality than the “proxy
standards” of income, consumption, or wealth); Stark, supra note 13, at 54–55 (concluding that
endowment taxation could redistribute cash in utility-enhancing directions).
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people differed in their wage rates but were identical in all other
respects. He demonstrated that the optimal system would leave each
member of society with the same number of after-tax-and-transfer
dollars (and thus with the same amount of purchased consumption),
28
but that higher-wage persons would work more hours than others.
The results can be explained intuitively. First, redistribution of cash
(and so of consumption opportunities) should continue until utility
gains from further redistribution are not possible, and that point will
be reached only when marginal utilities of cash have been equalized
across the population by equalizing after-tax-and-transfer cash
receipts. Second, for any given amount of foregone leisure, the work
of the more able produces more value—and hence more consumption
opportunities translatable into utility—than does the work of the less
able; it follows that utility is promoted if the more able work more
hours than the less able. Under this utility-maximizing endowment
tax, persons of higher ability are worse off than persons of lower
ability. Each person’s total utility is the sum of his utility from
consumption and his utility from leisure. Higher wage persons have
the same consumption as lower wage persons while having less
leisure, and so have lower total utility. To a thoroughgoing utilitarian
there is nothing wrong with that result, since it produces a higher sum
of individuals’ utilities than any other possible system. Few people
may remain utilitarians, however, if that requires accepting the
conclusion that the ideal tax-and-transfer system would make the
most talented members of society the least well-off.
II. LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM AND ENDOWMENT TAXATION
This Part considers the prima facie liberal egalitarian case for
endowment taxation, the “talent slavery” objection to endowment
taxation, and the possibility of designing an endowment tax so as to
avoid talent slavery. Talent slavery might be avoided by limiting the
redistributive ambition of the tax. It might also, and perhaps more
interestingly, be avoided by the use of more nuanced concepts of
endowment, focused on welfare rather than potential earnings, and
taking into account the disutility of work. Finally, this Part considers a
claim that endowment taxation is fundamentally “illiberal,” even
when talent slavery is not an issue.

28.

Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 201.
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A. The Prima Facie Case for Endowment Taxation
Although there is great diversity in liberal egalitarian theories of
distributive justice, the moral distinction between people’s “brute
luck” and the results of people’s choices is central to most liberal
egalitarians.29 Brute luck—including the distribution of abilities in the
natural lottery—is morally arbitrary. People do not deserve their
brute luck, either good or bad, and so the government should act to
ameliorate the disadvantages of those who have suffered from bad
brute luck. Once there has been appropriate redistribution with
respect to brute luck, however, the government should be neutral
with respect to the free choices made by different individuals
pursuing different visions of the good life. Thus the government
should not redistribute among people who, faced with the same
opportunities, make different choices and experience different
outcomes.
Although people do, of course, differ in their endowments of
financial wealth, the most significant differences in brute luck are
differences in human endowments—that is, differences in abilities
based on the morally arbitrary distribution of genetic inheritances
and the benefits of parental care and attention. Also morally arbitrary
are the differing rewards the economy happens to confer on people
possessing different skills. If some people are endowed with great
earnings potential and others are not, the egalitarian urge to lessen or
eliminate the effect of brute luck would suggest redistribution from
those with above-average ability (i.e., earnings potential) to those
with below-average ability; and since ability cannot be redistributed
in kind,30 the redistribution might take the form of cash transfers to

29. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 119 (describing “equal libertarianism”
as calling for redistribution to the extent necessary to produce “equality of opportunity in a
market economy”); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 916
(1989) (arguing that egalitarianism calls for the elimination of “involuntary disadvantage,” but
not for the elimination of the consequences of different individuals’ different choices); Ronald
Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 292–95
(1981) (distinguishing between “brute luck” and “option luck,” and suggesting that
redistribution with respect to the former is appropriate while redistribution with respect to the
latter is not); Markovits, supra note 15, at 2300 (labeling this view “responsibility-tracking
egalitarianism”); Eric Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 285
(2000) (“Liberal egalitarians like myself believe that justice asks a good deal of beneficiaries of
[brute] luck . . . .”).
30. That is, one person’s innate ability cannot be taken from that person and given to
another person. On the possibility of an endowment tax payable in labor rather than in dollars,
see infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
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the less able financed by taxes (payable, of course, in cash) on the
endowments of the more able. If we want to redistribute with respect
to endowment, then the ideal base for the tax to finance the
31
redistribution is necessarily endowment.
In theory, such a tax might be designed as either a one-time
tax—imposed perhaps at birth or upon reaching the age of 18 or 21—
on the present value of one’s lifetime earnings potential, or as an
annual tax on the maximum wages one could have earned in the
current year. Under certain stylized assumptions (most notably, a
single tax rate and the absence of any uncertainty about one’s lifetime
earnings potential), the two approaches are economically equivalent.
To avoid piling the impracticalities any higher than necessary, the
remainder of this discussion will assume the endowment tax under
consideration is of the annual variety. Imagine, then, two people who
have the same high earnings potential for the current year, but who
have made different choices—one to work at the highest available
wage for as many hours as humanly possible, the other to earn much
less by working at a more pleasant (or less unpleasant) lower wage
job, by working fewer hours, or both. A liberal egalitarian might
conclude that they should bear the same tax burden (to finance
redistribution to those of lower ability), despite their very different
cash incomes, since they had the same opportunities. If taxation is to
be sensitive to the distribution of brute luck, but insensitive to
differences resulting from different people making different choices,
then the tax system should not treat these two equally able persons
differently merely because one chose to work at a higher wage rate
(at a less pleasant job) or to work more hours.
In short, the prima facie liberal egalitarian case for a tax on
potential earnings, rather than on actual wages, is strong.
Nevertheless, liberal egalitarians generally end by rejecting
32
endowment taxation. The reasons for this rejection are described
and evaluated below.

31. Cf. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 123 (“If we want to redistribute ‘income,’ then of course
[income] is the right thing to tax . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 121–25 (concluding that “[t]he principal
ethical objection to endowment taxation [is that] it would constitute a . . . radical interference
with autonomy” and therefore “it would not be a serious option”); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 158 (2001) (rejecting an endowment tax because it “would violate
our basic liberties”); Rakowski, supra note 29, at 267 n.10 (noting that “[v]irtually nobody”
advocates a tax based directly on a person’s abilities).
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B. The Talent Slavery Objection
1. The Objection. The most prominent liberal egalitarian
objection to endowment taxation is that it would inevitably result in
33
“slavery of the talented.” Imagine a person with one skill very highly
valued by the economy who could earn $10 million in one year by
fully exploiting that skill. Suppose also that the market for that skill is
as lumpy as possible—i.e., he must either exploit that skill fully or not
at all—and that his next highest potential wage (doing a very different
sort of work) is $100,000. If he is taxed on his $10 million earnings
potential, at a rate of, say, 20 percent, he will owe $2 million tax. The
only way he can generate the money with which to pay the tax is to
spend the entire year working at his maximum earnings potential.
That is fine if he is happy (or even merely not unhappy) with that
work, but if he happens to hate the work the result is the slavery of
the talented. On pain of being consigned to debtors’ prison or exile or
perhaps the wilderness, he must spend the entire year doing work he
detests. As much as liberal egalitarians value equality of opportunity,
they also value autonomy, and many of them have concluded that the
interference with the autonomy of the talented produced by
endowment taxation is simply unacceptable.34 With the recent and
important exception of Daniel Markovits (whose views are discussed
35
below), the liberal egalitarians who have objected to endowment
taxation on grounds of talent slavery have done so quite summarily;
the objection has seemed so apparent and so conclusive as to require
little discussion.
Recently, however, several commentators have scrutinized the
talent slavery objection and found it wanting. The most detailed and
33. For an early use of talent slavery terminology in this context, see Dworkin, supra note
29, at 312, 322. The fullest and most thoughtful discussion of the taxation of earnings potential
and talent slavery is in Markovits, supra note 15, at 2305–13.
34. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 123 (“[T]he problem is not so much that
endowment taxation forces people to do what they would prefer not to do, but that it may leave
people with literally one option in life.”); RAWLS, supra note 32, at 158 (concluding that an
endowment tax—which Rawls, somewhat confusingly, refers to as a “head tax”—”would force
the more able into those occupations in which earnings were high enough for them to pay off
the tax in the required period of time; it would interfere with their liberty to conduct their life
within the scope of the principles of justice”); Rakowski, supra note 29, at 267 n.10 (“[Taxing
people on the value of unexploited earnings potential] would effectively enslave the able, by
forcing them to put their highly taxed talents to some lucrative employ, on pain of sitting in a
debtors’ prison, however unpalatable the person found richly compensated work”).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 45–53.
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most unequivocal rejection of the objection has come from Kirk
36
Stark. Professor Stark begins with Robert Nozick’s well-known
libertarian objection to the taxation of wages actually earned, as
“forcing the [taxed] person to work n hours for another’s purpose,”
and as therefore “on a par with forced labor.”37 Stark notes that
Professor Nozick’s involuntary servitude objection to income taxation
bears a marked resemblance to the liberal egalitarians’ talent slavery
objection to endowment taxation. In fact, he claims that “there is no
difference in kind or in degree between the interference with liberty
occasioned by the two types of taxes,” and that liberal egalitarians
must either accept Nozick’s critique of income taxation or “embrace
endowment taxes as a moral ideal.”38
Professor Stark makes his argument with the aid of a
hypothetical, based on a similar example offered by Professors
Murphy and Nagel, involving a sculptor subject to an endowment tax
and a corporate lawyer subject to an income tax.39 Each could
potentially earn $500,000 annually by practicing corporate law. The
sculptor would prefer to spend all his time sculpting pieces he will not
sell. The corporate lawyer would prefer to spend all his time
practicing law, in order to earn enough to buy a $500,000 painting he
covets. If the sculptor is subject to a 20 percent endowment tax (on
$500,000 of potential earnings), and the corporate lawyer is subject to
a 20 percent income tax (on $500,000 of actual earnings), they will

36. Stark, supra note 13. Daniel Shaviro has also suggested that the concern about talent
slavery may be overstated. Professor Shaviro notes that the current tax system penalizes the
decision to work for a wage, by taxing wages while not taxing leisure or imputed income from
services, but that liberal egalitarians do not view this inducement not to work as violating any
fundamental liberty interest. He suggests that liberal egalitarians who are unconcerned about
the inducement not to work produced by current law should not be so concerned about the
compulsion to work produced by an endowment tax: “Although compulsion is merely a strong
version of inducement (suggesting that they differ only in degree, not in kind), the inclination
[among liberal egalitarians] to put them in separate categories is apparently strong.” Shaviro,
supra note 12, at 143. Shaviro is perhaps insufficiently sensitive to the possibility that at some
point a difference in degree may become a difference in kind. As Murphy and Nagel remark,
being forced to work full time at a particular occupation (because only by so doing can one
generate enough cash to pay one’s endowment tax liability) is an “extreme interference with
autonomy,” which has no counterpart under a tax imposed only on income actually earned.
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 123.
37. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169 (1974), quoted in Stark, supra
note 13, at 48.
38. Stark, supra note 13, at 49.
39. Id. at 59. For the original version of the hypothetical, see MURPHY & NAGEL, supra
note 15, at 123.

02__ZELENAK.DOC

1158

10/13/2006 8:49 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1145

40
be—according to Stark—equally burdened. True, the sculptor will
have to spend 20 percent of his time practicing corporate law to
generate the $100,000 necessary to satisfy his tax obligation, but the
corporate lawyer will be similarly burdened by being able to buy only
a $400,000 painting. Each loses 20 percent of his preferred
consumption bundle—the sculptor by losing 20 percent of his desired
time to sculpt, and the lawyer by losing 20 percent of the desired
value of his art acquisition. Stark concludes that there is no difference
in kind or in degree between the impact of the endowment tax on the
liberty of the sculptor and the impact of the income tax on the liberty
of the lawyer.41 To Stark, if it is acceptable for the income tax to
commandeer the value of 20 percent of the lawyer’s time, it should
also be acceptable for an endowment tax to commandeer the value of
20 percent of the sculptor’s time.
Professor Stark mentions—but only in a footnote—that his
analysis is based on the assumption that the sculptor could earn
$100,000 by spending 20 percent of his time practicing law. He
concedes, “If labor markets are ‘lumpy’ and a particular wage rate
can only be achieved by working full-time, then the analysis may be
42
different.” If labor markets were completely nonlumpy, as Stark
supposes in his example, his conclusion would have considerable
appeal. It is not easy to view as the moral equivalent of slavery an
endowment tax that leaves the sculptor free to spend 80 percent of his
time sculpting. In such a world, the talent slavery objection would
lose most of its force, although a narrow “conscientious objector”
exception might still be needed for taxpayers who honestly
considered the best-paying use of their time to be not merely
unpleasant, but immoral (a view some sculptors might hold of
corporate law practice). One might also object that even in a world of
nonlumpy labor supply Stark’s endowment tax on the sculptor seems
acceptable only because of its relatively low rate; a tax at the rate of
50 percent, requiring the sculptor to spend half his time practicing
law, is instinctively much more troubling. Stark could reply, however,
that his assumed rate is reasonable, because a 20 percent endowment
tax might raise as much revenue as the current income tax (or even
more), given its considerably larger base.

40.
41.
42.

Stark, supra note 13, at 59.
Id.
Id. at 59 n.64.
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In their original version of the sculptor-and-lawyer hypothetical,
Professors Murphy and Nagel implicitly make the opposite
assumption about labor supply lumpiness: “[A] trained corporate
lawyer taxed according to $500,000 in potential annual earnings will
43
find that the time for sculpture is reduced almost to zero.” They are
obviously assuming that the only way he can earn $100,000 is by
working full time and earning $500,000; if they supposed he could
satisfy his tax obligation with 20 percent of his time they would not
claim he would have “almost zero” time left for sculpting. Thus, the
disagreement about the talent slavery implications of an endowment
tax appears to be based not on any difference of principle, but on
different assumptions about the extent to which highly talented
persons can exploit their talents in the market on a part-time basis.
Certainly Professor Stark could point to a few situations in which
labor markets approach the perfect nonlumpiness he assumes: if Tom
Cruise wants to devote most of his time to sculpting he could satisfy
his tax obligation by spending ten weeks each year making one movie.
It seems, though, that similar options are not available for highly
talented people in most other professions. If the extreme lumpiness
assumption of Murphy and Nagel is much closer to the real world
than the no lumpiness assumption of Stark, then Murphy and Nagel
have the better of the argument. If the endowment tax forces the
would-be sculptor to spend all of his time practicing corporate law,
that interference with his liberty is of a higher order of magnitude
than the income tax forcing the corporate lawyer to make do with a
$400,000 painting.
2. Designing an Endowment Tax that Avoids Talent Slavery. As
this discussion of the disagreement between Stark and Murphy and
Nagel suggests, the liberal egalitarian talent slavery objection is not a
fundamental objection to endowment taxation. If the labor market
were not lumpy, an endowment tax would not imply talent slavery.
Even assuming lumpiness in the labor market, liberal egalitarians
might accept—or even embrace—an endowment tax modified as
necessary to avoid talent slavery. One such modification has been
suggested—as an aside—by Louis Kaplow. Professor Kaplow notes
that “an ability tax with an upper limit of 90 percent of wages or
income actually earned would almost completely achieve the ability

43.

MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 123.

02__ZELENAK.DOC

1160

10/13/2006 8:49 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1145

44
tax result without literally violating the forced-labor constraint.” He
is certainly right that this hybrid endowment-income tax would not
raise any talent slavery concerns greater than those raised by a simple
income tax with a 90 percent top rate, and one supposes that most
liberal egalitarians would not view high rates under an income tax as
constituting talent slavery. Kaplow is on weaker ground, however,
when he claims that the hybrid tax would produce results closely
resembling a pure endowment tax. If taxpayers like the one described
earlier (with $10 million of potential earnings in one field but only
$100,000 actual earnings in a different field) really exist, a $90,000 tax
on $100,000 wages actually earned would not “almost completely
achieve the ability tax result” of a $2 million tax on $10 million of
potential earnings. In some cases, then, the hybrid tax is likely to be
much more of an income tax, and much less of an endowment tax,
than Kaplow supposes.
The most thorough consideration of how an endowment tax
might be designed to avoid talent slavery comes from Daniel
Markovits.45 His analysis begins by supposing that people know the
distribution of wage rates in their society, but that no one knows his
own particular wage rate.46 (People know their own skills, but they do
not know the wage rate those skills will command in the market.) In
this imagined original position, people might plausibly agree to a taxand-transfer system as a form of insurance against having been
unlucky in the talent lottery. If a low wage rate is the risk to be
insured against, the obvious policy tool would be an endowment
tax—a tax on the highly talented to finance cash transfers to the less
talented.47 The question then becomes how much insurance people
would agree to in the imagined original position. Professor Markovits
argues convincingly that people would not agree to the highest
possible level of insurance, under which a person with a belowaverage wage rate would receive a cash transfer equal to the excess of
the average (mean) annual wage for full-time work over his own

44. Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477, 1506
n.71 (1994).
45. Markovits, supra note 15, at 2305–13.
46. Id. at 2306.
47. Professor Markovits borrows from Professor Dworkin, Dworkin, supra note 29, at 323–
34, the model of endowment tax as insurance against the risk of having a low wage rate.
Markovits’s development of the model, however, is considerably more thorough and thoughtful
than Dworkin’s.
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48
potential earnings. The transfers required under that system could
be made only if each person with above-average earnings potential
worked full time at his highest possible wage rate, with all wages in
excess of the average being taxed at the rate of 100 percent for
transfer to those with below-average skills. But this would result in
talent slavery not just for a highly talented few, but for everyone with
an above-average maximum wage rate: “[S]he must always work flat
out and only at that job which, given her talents, pays most. She
would be forced to work at this job, and this job only, even if she
hated the work involved . . . .”49 No one in the original position would
agree to the level of insurance needed to eliminate the effect of brute
luck on the distribution of wage rates, when such insurance
50
necessarily imposes a high risk of talent slavery.
That much is clear, but a harder question remains: At what lower
level of wage-rate insurance, and associated endowment taxation,
would the risk of talent slavery be removed so that people in the
original position would agree to the insurance program? Professor
Markovits notes that there is no general answer to that question, but
he also explains that the “maximum talent-slavery-safe level of
insurance” will fall well below the average wage rate in a society in
which the distribution of earnings potential has a pronounced tail at
the high end:

[A]s the talent distribution becomes more dispersed, and
particularly as the median and the mode of the distribution fall
further below the mean (as the distribution develops a tail at the
high end), insuring even at levels below the mean will require people
to pay a greater proportion of their maximum wage as premiums,
premiums a smaller range of jobs will enable them to support. For
both reasons, the maximum talent-slavery-safe level of insurance
51
will in such cases fall further below the mean.

Performing some back-of-the-envelope calculations based on the
1999 wage distribution in the United States (featuring an impressive
tail at the high end), Markovits plausibly concludes that people aware
of that wage distribution but unaware of their own wage rate “would

48.
49.
50.
51.

Markovits, supra note 15, at 2307–09.
Id. at 2308.
Id. at 2308–09.
Id. at 2310.
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insure only up to talent levels that fall significantly—more than 25
52
percent—below the mean.”
Endowment taxation and talent slavery are not the central
themes of Professor Markovits’s article (and perhaps for that reason
his article has previously gone unnoticed by endowment tax
commentators). Rather, he uses his discussion of endowment taxation
to support his major thesis, which is that the two goals of many liberal
egalitarians—elimination of inequalities due to brute luck, while
respecting differences resulting from different people having made
different choices—are logically incompatible. The significance of
endowment taxation to Markovits’s thesis is that endowment taxation
can eliminate brute luck only under a full insurance scheme that
people would reject if given the choice. Thus one must either
abandon the goal of eliminating inequality of brute luck in order to
respect choice, or abandon the goal of respecting choice in order to
53
eliminate inequality of brute luck. Quite apart from Markovits’s
thesis, however, his analysis has important implications for the
ongoing debate over endowment taxation and talent slavery. It
provides an attractive account of endowment taxation as wage rate
insurance, and situates the talent slavery concern as a constraint in
the design of the endowment tax system, rather than as an argument
against endowment taxation in any form.
C. Refining the Definition of Endowment
The talent slavery objection is aimed at an endowment tax which
defines endowment as one’s maximum wage rate multiplied by the
maximum number of hours one could work, without regard to the
utility or disutility associated with that level of work effort. There are
two possible refinements of the concept of endowment, however,
each of which arguably does a better job of measuring real differences
in brute luck than the simple notion of potential earnings. Each of
these refinements can be defended as being preferable to potential
earnings as an ideal tax base, and each has the additional benefit of
ameliorating the talent slavery problem.

52.
53.

Id. at 2313.
Id. at 2323.
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1. The Musgrave Proposal. The first refinement has been
54
offered by Richard Musgrave. According to Professor Musgrave, an
ideal tax-and-transfer system would redistribute not with respect to
55
potential income, but with respect to potential welfare. He illustrates
his point with an example involving two persons with different wage
rates, who are identical in all other respects. The welfare of each
person is a function of his hours of leisure and his consumption of
goods. The two persons have identical utility functions, so each will
enjoy the same level of welfare as the other from any given
combination of hours of leisure and dollars of consumption. In the
absence of a tax-and-transfer system, the person with the higher wage
rate (H) will have a higher level of welfare, as he can select a
combination of leisure and consumption that will place him on an
indifference curve higher than any indifference curve reachable by
the person with the lower wage rate (L).56 Under the standard view of
endowment taxation, complete elimination of the brute luck
difference in their wage rates would require a transfer from H to L
sufficient to give the two persons equal net-of-transfer potential
57
consumption. For example, if H’s hourly wage is $60, L’s is $10, and
there are 4,000 potential work hours in a year, the required transfer
would be $100,000.58 Although this will equalize the potential
consumptions of H and L, it will leave L with a higher level of welfare
than H. Suppose, for example, that faced with the $100,000 tax-andtransfer program, H decided to work 3,333 hours (generating
$200,000 of pretax income) and L decided not to work at all. Each
would have $100,000 available for consumption after the transfer of
$100,000 from H to L, but L would have 4,000 hours of leisure while
H had only 667 hours.59

54. Richard Musgrave, Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off, 88 Q.J. ECON.
625 (1974).
55. Id. at 630 & nn.10–11.
56. An indifference curve indicates all the combinations of leisure and consumption which
would produce the same level of utility for a person. Thus, a person would be indifferent as to
the choice among leisure-consumption combinations located on the same indifference curve.
57. This is, of course, the sort of tax which Professor Markovits concludes would never be
agreed to by persons in the original position. See supra text accompanying note 50.
58. H’s net-of-transfer potential wage would then be (4000 x $60) - $100,000 = $140,000,
and L’s net-of-transfer potential wage would then be (4000 x $10) + $100,000 = $140,000.
59. This is closely related to James Mirrlees’s observation that a utility-maximizing tax on
potential earnings will leave the more talented with lower utility than the less talented. See
Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 201 (“It is worth noticing that . . . with the particular welfare function
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Quite apart from the question of whether H is a victim of talent
slavery, a tax-and-transfer program which systematically leaves more
talented persons with lower welfare than less talented persons seems
inconsonant with liberal egalitarian conceptions of justice.
Accordingly, Professor Musgrave’s ideal system would require a
smaller transfer from H to L, designed not to equalize their potential
incomes, but instead to equalize their welfares by putting them at
different points on the same indifference curve. Musgrave describes
this approach as “a tax on income and leisure, imposed at the proper
60
rate by an omniscient referee.” Suppose, for example, that both H
and L (who by hypothesis have identical utility functions) would be
indifferent between having $140,000 of consumption and 1,000 hours
of leisure, or having $40,000 of consumption and 4,000 hours of
leisure. If H responds to a $40,000 lump sum tax by working 3,000
hours and L responds to a $40,000 transfer by not working at all, then
H will have a package of $140,000 consumption ($180,000 wages
minus $40,000 tax) and 1,000 hours of leisure, and L will have a
package of $40,000 consumption and 4,000 hours of leisure. Although
H has more consumption and L has more leisure, the two are equally
well-off, and the goal of eliminating welfare differences attributable
to brute luck has been achieved. And it has been done by a transfer of
only $40,000, compared with the $100,000 transfer that would have
been required to equalize their potential incomes. As Musgrave
explains, “The taxpayer’s [H’s] loss of leisure due to more work
reduces his welfare just as the transfer recipient’s [L’s] gain of leisure
raises it, thus narrowing the remaining need for income transfer.”61
Although Professor Musgrave makes a strong argument that
welfare is a more appropriate object of redistribution than potential
income as a matter of first principles, he also claims that basing the
tax on welfare has the attraction of neatly sidestepping the talent
slavery problem raised by taxation of earnings potential:
While the high-ability person gives up both goods and leisure, this is
merely the outcome of his free choice between them, made in
response to the lump sum tax. . . . The prior concern for leisure, it

specified . . . utility will be less for more highly skilled individuals.”), discussed supra in text
accompanying note 28.
60. Musgrave, supra note 54, at 631 n.11.
61. Id. at 632.
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appears, is not needed in the context of a just solution, although it is
62
appropriate if relative positions are viewed in terms of goods only.

To put Professor Musgrave’s point in Professor Markovits’s terms,
persons in the original position would not view with abhorrence the
possibility of turning out to be a high-ability person under Musgrave’s
welfare tax. Since the tax is designed to leave high-ability persons
with as high a level of welfare as anyone else, the result cannot be
reasonably viewed as talent slavery.
As presented by Professor Musgrave, his approach assumes (as
in the illustration) that people are identical in all respects except wage
rates. Differences in individuals’ utility functions—including
differences in the utility derived from any given dollar amount of
consumption and differences in the disutility associated with work—
presumably would be ignored in the construction of a Musgraveinspired tax system. (This would seem to be a necessity, if the system
is to be merely extremely difficult to administer, rather than
absolutely impossible.) The reliance on a single standardized utility
function means the Musgrave approach would not really equalize
welfare. If the disregarding of individualized utility information were
combined with lumpy labor supply, it is also possible that talent
slavery problems would remain under the Musgrave approach,
despite Musgrave’s claim to the contrary. In the illustration above, for
example, things work out neatly only because H has the option of
working 3,000 hours at $60 per hour. If the only way H can earn $60
per hour is by working 4,000 hours at a job he hates, and if his
alternative wage rate with fewer hours worked is much lower, the
problem of talent slavery has not been eliminated. It remains true,
however, that talent slavery concerns would be much diminished in a
Musgrave-inspired tax-and-transfer system, compared with the
problems under a tax based simply on potential earnings.
2. Factoring in the Disutility of Labor Effort. The above
discussion suggests that the definition of endowment as potential
earnings is deficient because it disregards the significance of hours of
leisure to overall welfare. It can also be argued that the definition of
endowment as potential earnings is deficient because it disregards the
utility or disutility people experience from work. Consider a person
who could earn a high wage, but chooses instead to work at a

62.

Id.
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different job for a much lower wage. Such persons are objects of great
63
solicitude for opponents of endowment taxation. But why would a
person who could work at a higher wage decide to work at a lower
wage (assuming the time demands of the two jobs are the same, so
there is no question of more or fewer hours of leisure)? It must be
because of differences in the utility (negative or positive) associated
with supplying his labor in the two situations. One possibility is that
he hates the high wage job, while he neither likes nor dislikes the low
wage job. If the disutility associated with the high wage job causes
him to take the low wage job, then his welfare if he took the high
wage job would be no higher (and would probably be lower) than the
welfare he experiences with the low wage job. If endowment is
defined not narrowly as potential earnings, but more broadly as
potential earnings plus or minus the utility or disutility associated
with the work necessary to generate those earnings, then this person’s
true endowment is properly measured by his actual low wages. His
actual low wages plus zero labor utility from the low wage job must
equal or exceed his potential high wages minus the labor disutility
from the high wage job. Under this concept of net endowment, an
income tax would produce for this person the same result as a tax on
his net endowment, whereas a tax on potential earnings would tax
him on more than his net endowment.
If all persons who turned their backs on high wage jobs did so
because they hated those jobs, and if a tax system were based on this
concept of net endowment, the problem of talent slavery would be
solved, as net endowment could never be higher than wages actually
earned. A person who would not do high wage work because he
hated it would be treated just like someone who could not do high
wage work because he lacked the skill. As a solution to the talent
slavery problem this amounts to killing the endowment tax in order to
save it, since the best way of implementing this vision of an
endowment tax would be with a traditional income tax.
Although this position—that an income tax is actually a good
approximation of an endowment tax, if endowment is defined to take
into account labor disutility—has considerable appeal, it is subject to
two objections. First, a distaste for high wage work can be viewed as a
kind of expensive taste (because the alternative uses of one’s time are
63. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 123 (considering the example of a
potential sculptor who must work as a corporate lawyer to pay his taxes under an endowment
tax).
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expensive in terms of foregone income), and there is a prominent
liberal egalitarian argument, associated primarily with Ronald
Dworkin, that distributive justice should make no allowance for
expensive tastes. Working from a model of tax-and-transfer systems
as insurance against bad brute luck, Professor Dworkin concludes
that insurance against expensive tastes is inappropriate, because one’s
64
tastes are an integral part of one’s personhood. As there is no reason
to suppose people would want to insure against being other than who
they are, there is no reason to suppose people would want to insure
against having different tastes than they actually have. This view has
been convincingly refuted, however, by Daniel Markovits. He
suggests that a person in the original position, who knows his tastes
but not whether they are expensive, might well want “insurance not
against having the taste, but rather against turning out to live in a
world in which it is expensive.”65 By the same token, a person who
hates a particular job might want to insure against the possibility that
the hated job pays a high wage and thus would generate a huge tax
bill under a tax system based on potential earnings. The simplest way
of providing such insurance might be simply to abandon the taxation
of potential earnings in favor of taxing only actual earnings.
The second objection to the idea of an income tax as the best
embodiment of a net endowment tax is less easily answered. In the
preceding illustration, the income tax works well as a net endowment
tax only because the example assumes the person turns down the high
wage job because he hates it, rather than because he loves the low
wage job. Suppose instead that the person neither likes nor dislikes
the high wage job, loves the low wage job, and decides to take the low
wage job. If so, taxing him on the potential earnings from the high
wage job may be appropriate, since his utility from his current
situation is as high as the utility associated with his potential earnings.
In the previous example, his net endowment was no greater than his
actual wages from the low wage job, but in this example his net
endowment is at least as great as the potential wages from the high
wage job. Even if the effect of a tax on potential wages were to force
him to take the high wage job, it would be hard to view that as talent
slavery if he does not dislike the high wage job.

64.
65.

Dworkin, supra note 29, at 303.
Markovits, supra note 15, at 2315.
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Although this second objection has force, it may not be powerful
enough to rehabilitate taxation of potential wages. If one’s ideal tax
base would be net endowment (i.e., potential wages plus labor utility
or minus labor disutility), but for the inability to measure labor utility
or disutility, then the available second best choices are an income tax
or a tax on potential earnings. The choice, then, would be based on
(1) which tax would produce more errors, (2) the magnitudes of the
errors produced by each tax, and (3) whether the type of errors
produced under one tax is worse than the type of errors produced
under the other. The income tax produces errors when a person
chooses low wage work because he loves it, whereas the tax on
potential earnings produces errors when a person avoids high wage
work because he hates it. My suspicion is that hatred of high wage
work is more common than love of low wage work, in which case the
income tax would produce fewer errors. Even if empirical
investigation proved that suspicion wrong, one might still favor the
income tax on the basis that the errors produced by a tax on potential
earnings result in talent slavery, whereas the more numerous errors
produced by the income tax would have less dire consequences. In
sum, if redistribution would ideally be done with respect to net
endowment—defined as potential wages adjusted for the utility or
disutility of work—it is difficult to conclude that a tax on potential
wages is superior to an income tax in its approximation of the ideal.66

66. The discussion in the text only scratches the surface of the possible relationships
between potential wages and the utility or disutility of work. As a more elaborate example,
consider the following three persons, all of whom work the same number of hours:
A works at a high wage job (HWJ) which he neither likes nor dislikes.
B could work at the same HWJ as A, which he would neither like nor dislike, but works
instead at a low wage job (LWJ), which he loves.
C does not have the skills for HWJ, so he works at the same LWJ as B, which he loves as
much as B loves his LWJ.
If the ideal tax base is net endowment (i.e., potential wages plus work utility or minus work
disutility), then B has a net endowment at least as high as A, and C has the same net endowment
as B. As the discussion in the text indicates, a net endowment tax could reasonably tax B on his
high potential wages, even if it meant B had to move from the low wage job to the high wage
job. The problem for the net endowment tax is C, who is just as well off in net endowment terms
as B (same wages and same utility from work), but who unlike B does not have the ability to
cash out his love of his job by moving to a high wage job. A comprehensive tax on net
endowment may not be possible, then, if it would impose a higher tax burden on C than he
could possible pay in cash. The response to this problem might be to revise the concept of net
endowment, so that one’s utility should be included in the tax base only to the extent one could
convert it to cash. The tax would then be neither a pure tax on utility nor a pure tax on potential
earnings, but a hybrid of the two.
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So far the discussion in this section has abstracted from Professor
Musgrave’s concern about differences in hours of leisure, by assuming
that persons differ in their earnings and in their love or hate of their
work, but not in the division of their time between work and leisure.
A comprehensive concept of endowment, however, might include
both a Musgravean consideration of leisure and a consideration of
differences in the utility or disutility of work. Designing a tax system
reflective of that concept of endowment would be a daunting task, but
a point made by Louis Kaplow is worth noting in this regard.
Professor Kaplow has demonstrated that if two persons with different
wage rates nevertheless have the same earned income, because the
person with the higher wage rate experiences greater labor disutility
and so works fewer hours, then the two persons will also have the
same total utility (assuming they are identical in all other respects).67
Compared with the lower wage person, the greater utility the higher
wage person derives from more leisure is precisely offset by the
greater disutility he suffers from working. The two persons are
equally well-off under a comprehensive definition of endowment
(reflecting their available packages of consumption, labor utility or
disutility, and leisure), and a simple income tax on their identical
incomes would appropriately subject them to equal tax burdens. It
does not follow that an income tax always magically replicates the
results that would be achieved by a tax based on a broad concept of
endowment,68 but one could do worse than an income tax from this
perspective.
D. Endowment Taxation as “Distinctly Illiberal”:
The Hasen Objection
The standard objection of liberal egalitarians to endowment
taxation (in the usual sense of a tax on earnings potential) is that it
will result in talent slavery. David Hasen, however, has recently
lodged a more fundamental objection.69 According to Professor
Hasen, endowment taxation should be unacceptable to liberal
egalitarians, quite apart from any risk of talent slavery. As is common

67. Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics ch. 5, at 17–18 (2006)
(unpublished preliminary draft, on file with author).
68. For example, consider individuals A and B in the illustration in note 66. Under a
comprehensive definition of endowment, B’s endowment is at least as great as A’s, but B’s
income tax liability would be much less than A’s.
69. Hasen, supra note 14.
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in liberal egalitarian accounts of distributive justice, Hasen asks what
sort of social contract people might agree to from “a ‘pre70
governmental’ bargaining situation.” He believes that the social
contract would reflect a strong concern for “autonomy, understood as
the right to posit and realize one’s own ends with minimal
interference from others.”71 People in the original position would
agree to constraints on their autonomy only to the extent those
constraints were needed in order to make possible the benefits of
social cooperation. Under this view, “the point of taxation is to
allocate the costs of producing benefits that membership in a system
of social cooperation confers,”72 and the natural tax base is therefore
the benefits of social cooperation. Because earned income is the
result of social cooperation but potential earnings are not, actual
income is an appropriate tax base but potential income is not:
[I]t is the specific nature of income—that it is produced through
cooperation—that confers the right to tax it in the first place. It is
the production of actual, not possible, income that political society
facilitates and for which the participants must pay; the system does
73
not . . . produce income-earning capacity.

If interference with autonomy is justified only to the extent necessary
to facilitate social cooperation, and if unexploited earnings capacity is
not produced through social cooperation, it follows that “the value of
autonomy largely rules out endowment taxation.”74 This goes far
beyond a concern about possible talent slavery: “[I]n order to make
endowment taxation legitimate within a liberal framework, one would
need to locate some additional constitutive principle that could
support it, because autonomy as an organizing principle leaves
essentially no room for it.”75

70. Id. at 13.
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 30.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 17. Mark Kelman appears to have taken essentially the same position, in a much
less fully-developed form, a quarter century earlier. Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions
Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from
Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 842 n.33 (1979).
75. Hasen, supra note 14, at 19. Professor Hasen does not discuss the possibility of an
ultimate exit option under an endowment tax—i.e., that a person who did not want to be taxed
on his unused earnings potential could escape the tax by leaving the country, or perhaps by
remaining in the country but living on his own in the wilderness. Presumably he would consider
the protection of autonomy afforded by an exit option to be insufficient.

02__ZELENAK.DOC

2006]

10/13/2006 8:49 AM

TAXING ENDOWMENT

1171

Professor Hasen’s claim is subject to three quibbles, and to one
major objection. The first quibble, which Hasen notes himself, is that
even people who choose to earn little or no income—such as the oftinvoked beachcomber—may benefit from social cooperation to the
extent they are protected by the police and fire departments, and by
national defense. Hasen concedes that endowment taxation “might be
76
perfectly appropriate” as to those benefits. Second, Hasen does not
consider the possibility that unused earnings capacity might be a
measure of noncash benefits of cooperation. If a law professor could
have earned much more as a corporate lawyer, but chooses a teaching
career because of its intangible joys, those joys are benefits of social
cooperation, and they could be reached through a tax on potential
earnings. Third, Hasen does not acknowledge the autonomy case for
an endowment tax rather than an income tax. The substitution effect
of an income tax pushes taxpayers away from earning income and
toward nontaxed uses of their time. If a proper respect for autonomy
requires the government to be as nearly neutral as possible among
different ends, conceptions of the good, and uses of time, it is not
clear that an income tax is preferable to an endowment tax. True, the
requirement that an endowment tax be paid in cash may push people
into the workforce (in the extreme case resulting in talent slavery),
but because one’s endowment tax does not depend on how one
spends one’s time, the endowment tax avoids the favoritism for
leisure (and for low-wage, high-pleasure employment) inherent in an
income tax.
The major objection, however, is that Professor Hasen’s
argument depends on a constricted view of what qualifies as liberal
egalitarian thought. His account of distributive justice and the social
contract is a plausible one, and he is right that endowment taxation
would be ruled out under that account. But could not one imagine a
different version of the social contract, under which people in the
original position would agree to endowment taxation? Hasen asks
this question himself: “Why can’t or wouldn’t the parties to the
original bargaining position agree to make some or all of their
endowments the subject of their agreement [and thus subject to
tax]?”77 He answers, “[W]hile such an approach is possible, it is also
distinctly illiberal.”78 It is illiberal because by “compel[ling] more than
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 30 n.94.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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a minimal amount of social cooperation” it does not sufficiently
79
respect autonomy. Despite Hasen’s claim that his argument applies
with respect to “liberal political theories in general,”80 across a wide
range of liberal egalitarian thought, his conclusion follows only under
a narrow view of what constitutes liberal egalitarianism. Certainly a
number of other thinkers, liberal egalitarians by self-identification
and by common understanding—including Ronald Dworkin, Daniel
Markovits, Liam Murphy, and Thomas Nagel—have found
endowment taxation compatible with liberal egalitarianism, apart
from talent slavery concerns.81 The appeal is based on the idea,
pioneered by Professor Dworkin and developed by Professor
Markovits, that people in the original position might favor
endowment taxation as low-endowment insurance, at least if it could
be done without talent slavery.82 This follows from the value liberal
egalitarians place on ameliorating differences among individuals
attributable to brute luck. Although that value must be weighed
against the interference with autonomy caused by endowment
taxation, it is not clear why anyone who thinks the insurance positives
of endowment taxation (limited as necessary to avoid talent slavery)
outweigh the autonomy negatives should be declared a heretic and
excommunicated from the liberal egalitarian church.83 Unless one is
willing to deny the liberal egalitarian credentials of the likes of
Dworkin, Markovits, Murphy, and Nagel, Hasen’s argument is only a
liberal egalitarian case against endowment taxation, not the liberal
egalitarian case.
III. SLOUCHING TOWARD ENDOWMENT TAXATION
Despite David Hasen’s claim to the contrary, a liberal egalitarian
might reasonably conclude that redistribution from those with better
luck in the natural lottery to those with worse luck is normatively
attractive. Such a liberal egalitarian would support something along

79. Id. at 28.
80. Id. at 30.
81. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 15, at 121–25; Dworkin, supra note 29, at 311–12;
Markovits, supra note 15, at 2305–13.
82. See supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text.
83. According to Professor Hasen, autonomy is a “constitutive” principle of liberal
egalitarianism, rather than a mere “regulative” principle, with the result that it cannot be
balanced against other values. Hasen, supra note 14, at 17–19. Apparently, anyone who
disagrees with Hasen on this point is not, in Hasen’s view, a true liberal egalitarian.
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the lines of an endowment tax, although he would insist that it be
designed to avoid talent slavery and he might believe that mere
earnings capacity (not taking into account, for example, differences in
labor disutility) is inadequate as a measure of a person’s net brute
luck. Thus Daniel Shaviro has suggested that liberal egalitarians
should employ endowment as an “orienting idea” in thinking about
tax-and-transfer policy, and that “[t]he idea [of endowment taxation]
deserves greater prominence and acceptance, even though we will
never see, and probably do not want to see, a literal, direct
84
endowment tax.”
The question then becomes to what extent it might be both
practical and desirable to take steps in the direction of endowment
taxation, without adopting a full-fledged endowment tax. One
possibility has already been mentioned—Louis Kaplow’s suggestion
that the talent slavery problem could be solved by a tax on potential
earnings, subject to the limitation that a person’s tax liability shall
85
never exceed 90 percent of his actual earnings. Kaplow does not
actually endorse this idea, and it is obviously a political nonstarter. In
addition to the formidable administrative difficulties involved in
determining each person’s maximum wage rate, even with the ceiling
the tax would be opposed by many as unduly burdensome to those
who fail to realize their maximum earning potential because doing so
would require them to work at jobs they would hate.86
There may, however, be smaller steps in the endowment tax
direction which are not subject to such serious objections. A
thoughtful discussion of practical ideas for partial implementation of
endowment tax principles appears in a recent article by Kyle Logue
and Ronen Avraham.87 The significance of the article to the
endowment tax debate is somewhat obscured by the fact that the
article is framed not as a contribution to the endowment tax literature
but as a contribution to the literature on the appropriate use of
taxation vis-à-vis nontax legal rules. The article is a response to the
claim of some law and economics scholars—most notably Louis

84. Shaviro, supra note 12, at 125, 144.
85. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
86. Conversely, endowment tax purists—if any exist—would object that the 90 percent-ofactual-wages ceiling prevents the hybrid tax from being a close approximation of a true
endowment tax, for those who earn far below their potential. See supra text accompanying note
44.
87. Logue & Avraham, supra note 15.
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Kaplow and Steven Shavell—that redistribution should be
accomplished solely through the tax-and-transfer system, rather than
88
also through nontax legal rules. The article’s thesis is that many
differences in brute luck are not captured by differences in incomeproducing capacities, that a liberal society may desire to redistribute
with respect to some of these non-income-related inequalities, and
that legal rules will sometimes have important advantages over tax
rules in accomplishing such redistribution.89
Their most compelling example relates to genetically-determined
90
diseases. If we want to redistribute from those without diseaserelated genes to victims of genetic bad luck, it would be theoretically
possible to impose a tax directly on the good luck of not having a
particular disease-related gene, and to transfer the resulting tax
revenue to those with the gene. A similar result could be reached
much more simply, however, by a nontax law prohibiting health
insurers from discriminating against persons with the gene (either by
refusing to offer them any coverage, or by charging them higher
premiums). Such a nondiscrimination rule would redistribute from
those without the disease-related gene to those with the gene, and this
redistribution would be accomplished almost effortlessly compared
with the alternative of (1) allowing insurers to discriminate against
persons with disease-related genes and (2) using the tax-and-transfer
system to offset the effects of that discrimination. The
nondiscrimination rule approach thus has the uncanny effect of
redistributing on the basis of a particular aspect of genetic
endowment without the need for determining anyone’s actual genetic
information.
Although the fact that the insurance nondiscrimination rule is a
nontax law is crucial in the debate between Professors Logue and
Avraham and Professors Kaplow and Shavell, the significance of the
Logue-Avraham analysis for endowment taxation lies elsewhere. As
Logue and Avraham themselves point out, “at the margins, these
categories—tax rules and legal rules—begin to break down.”91

88. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
89. Logue & Avraham, supra note 15, at 252–57.
90. Id. at 208–18.
91. Id. at 208.
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Suppose, for example, that the United States moved to a system of
universal government-sponsored health insurance, financed by
taxation, and that the system was designed (on both the tax and the
insurance sides) to avoid discrimination on the basis of diseaserelated genes. This would accomplish the same redistribution as the
nondiscrimination rule suggested by Logue and Avraham, but would
it be redistribution by way of tax rules or by way of nontax legal
rules? For present purposes, the answer is that it does not really
matter. What is important is that Logue and Avraham have identified
a situation in which the government could and arguably should
redistribute on the basis of one (nonincome related) aspect of
endowment; whether that redistribution is better accomplished
through tax or nontax means is a lower order question. In any event,
if the redistribution occurs in the context of a government-sponsored
insurance program financed by taxation, it will be accomplished
through the tax system. In fact, something like this is already being
done. Medicare is a massive tax-and-transfer system, which
redistributes from healthy participants to sick participants (in
addition to redistributing along a number of other dimensions). To
the considerable extent that good or bad health among the elderly is a
matter of brute luck rather than lifestyle choices, Medicare
redistributes on the basis of one aspect of endowment.92 Similarly, one
of the dimensions along which Social Security redistributes is
longevity; the system benefits long-lived recipients at the expense of
the short-lived. Longevity can be viewed in this context, somewhat
counterintuitively, as a negative aspect of endowment (because of the
costs associated with it), against which people in the original position
might want to insure through a government-sponsored annuity
program. Under this view, Social Security constitutes another form of
existing redistribution on the basis of a particular component of
endowment, accomplished through a tax-and-transfer program.93
Does this sort of partial endowment taxation make sense? Is it
justifiable to redistribute on the basis of one or more selected
components of endowment in isolation, without regard to the total
endowment of the persons involved in the redistribution? Would it be
fair, for example, for a billionaire with a disease-related gene to
benefit from the limited endowment tax inherent in a health
92. Professors Logue and Avraham briefly note this point. Id. at 226–27.
93. Id. at 227 n.211 (describing Social Security as “produc[ing] transfers from the shortlived to the long-lived”).
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insurance nondiscrimination mandate? Professors Logue and
Avraham argue that it would be fair, for two reasons. The first reason
94
they label the “independence assumption.” The idea is that some
types of inequality of brute luck may be appropriate subjects for
redistribution, without regard to the overall distribution of brute luck.
Thus, redistribution within the health insurance system to those with
disease-related genes is justified, even to persons who happen to be
rich, if we believe that the genetic “source of inequality is
problematic, not as a proxy for well-being, but in and of itself.”95 Even
if the independence assumption is rejected, however, Logue and
Avraham claim it would still make sense to use different
redistributive tools to redistribute with respect to different
components of overall endowment, with each tool aimed at the
component “for which that instrument has a comparative advantage
at either observing [the component of endowment] or redistributing
[with respect to that component] or both.”96 Thus, although a single
tax on a comprehensive definition of endowment (i.e., net brute luck)
is impossible, the closest practical approximation of that ideal might
include, among other things, (1) an income tax as a very imperfect
means of redistributing with respect to earnings capacity, (2) health
insurance subject to a nondiscrimination mandate as redistribution
with respect to the presence or absence of disease-related genes, and
(3) Social Security as redistribution with respect to longevity luck.
Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott have proposed slouching
97
toward endowment taxation from a different direction. They would
replace Social Security retirement benefits based on earnings histories
with “citizen’s pensions” payable in equal amounts to all elderly
citizens.98 They would finance these pensions not with payroll taxes,
but with a new “privilege tax.” Each person would be required to pay
the privilege tax annually, from the age of twenty-one to the age of
sixty-seven,99 with the size of the annual tax bill depending on one’s
parents’ income during one’s childhood.100 The tax would identify

94. Id. at 245.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 246.
97. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 155–77
(1999) (proposing a “privilege tax” to finance the Stakeholder Society).
98. Id. at 129–54.
99. Id. at 168–69.
100. Id. at 166–67.
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three levels of privilege: taxpayers with parents in the top 20 percent
of the income distribution would pay the highest tax (Ackerman and
Alstott suggest $3,800 per year), taxpayers with parents in the middle
60 percent of the income distribution would pay a lower tax (they
suggest $2,090 per year), and taxpayers with parents in the bottom 20
percent of the income distribution would pay the lowest tax (they
101
suggest $380 per year).
Professors Ackerman and Alstott explicitly deny that their
proposal constitutes an endowment tax, for two reasons. First, they
claim that their proposal is narrower than an endowment tax, because
it focuses on a single aspect of endowment—economic privilege
during childhood (what they call “social privilege”)—while
disregarding all other differences (including genetic endowment and
102
in-kind parental care and attention). But this merely means that
their proposal is—in the spirit of Professors Logue and Avraham—
for a partial endowment tax, rather than a comprehensive endowment
tax. This limited form of endowment tax has two significant
attractions. First, social privilege (as defined by Ackerman and
Alstott), unlike genetic endowment and parental care and attention,
is susceptible to reasonably accurate measurement. Second, many
persons who believe that society has no valid claim on the benefits of
a person’s genetic endowment (which society arguably had no role in
creating) may concede that society has a legitimate claim on the
benefits of economic privilege during childhood (privilege which
could not have existed in the absence of the state).
The second distinction offered by Professors Ackerman and
Alstott between their proposal and an endowment tax cuts in the
opposite direction: they claim their proposal is broader than an
endowment tax because an endowment tax is concerned only with
earning power, whereas the privilege tax is aimed at the “intangible
social and psychological advantages” conferred by childhood social
103
privilege, in addition to “market advantages.” Although this does
make the privilege tax different from an endowment tax as usually
defined, in fact it moves their proposal closer to a comprehensive
definition of endowment as net brute luck.

101.
102.
103.

Id. at 159, 166–68.
Id. at 259 n.10.
Id.
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Professors Ackerman and Alstott have an interesting answer to
the anticipated talent slavery objection—or, in their words, the
concern that the privilege tax “interferes with the liberty of privileged
104
children to pursue low-paying careers.” According to them, this
objection “gets the point precisely backward: the obligation to
contribute to society in accordance with privilege is prior to one’s
105
liberty to choose careers.” Although not all readers will be satisfied
with this easy dismissal of the talent slavery concern, their response is
plausible in the context of their proposed privilege tax, whereas the
same response would clearly be inadequate in the context of a
proposed full-fledged tax on potential earnings. The priority of the
tax obligation over free choice of career is defensible because of two
design features of the privilege tax. First, the low maximum amount
of annual tax (less than $4,000) means even a would-be full-time
beachcomber would have to work only a modest number of hours,
with a wide range of occupational choices, in order to pay the tax.
Second, it is more plausible to place the obligation to pay for one’s
social privilege (measured in dollars of parental income) ahead of
one’s ability to choose a career, than it is to give the same priority to
an obligation to pay for one’s genetic endowment; this is because
society played a greater role in the creation of one’s social privilege
than it played in the creation of one’s genetic endowment.
None of this is to say that the privilege tax is necessarily a good
idea. For a tax proposed as a progressive replacement for “the
regressive payroll-tax categories”106 currently used to finance Social
Security benefits, the tax is strangely regressive. If childhood privilege
is appropriately measured by parental income during childhood, a tax
that takes from the children of Bill and Melinda Gates less than twice
the amount it takes from the children of median wage parents, and
only ten times what it takes from the children of the poorest parents,
is highly regressive with respect to privilege. In fact, the privilege tax
appears to be distributionally quite similar to the regressive payroll
tax it would replace. Whether or not one favors the privilege tax,
however, the major point for present purposes is that the privilege tax
is another example of how we might slouch toward an endowment tax
in ways that avoid many or all of the theoretical and practical
objections associated with a full-fledged endowment tax.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 264 n.52.
Id.
Id. at 169.
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The taxation of “indicator goods” as a supplement to a tax on
labor income can also be understood as slouching toward endowment
taxation. This concept, which comes from the economics literature,
has been introduced to the legal literature in a recent article by
107
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach. An indicator good is one
which is consumed differentially by persons of different ability levels,
108
even when those persons have the same earned income. Suppose,
for example, that high culture (such as Shakespeare and opera) is an
indicator good positively associated with ability, while cigarettes are
indicator goods negatively associated with ability. In that case, a
person with $100,000 of earned income who subscribes to the opera
and does not smoke probably has higher innate ability than a person
who earns $100,000, smokes, and hates opera. If the income tax were
supplemented by taxes on indicator goods associated with high ability
and subsidies for indicator goods associated with low ability, that
would be a move in the direction of endowment taxation.109
Emmanuel Saez has suggested, rather provocatively, that savings is an
indicator good (i.e., at any given level of labor income, persons of
higher ability will typically save more than persons of lower ability),
and that the taxation of investment income under an income tax can
thus be viewed as a move toward endowment taxation, relative to a
tax on only labor income.110
Once one begins to think in terms of partial endowment taxation,
one may see various aspects of current law as unacknowledged forms
of limited endowment taxation. Under Professor Saez’s analysis, all
taxation of investment income may be so understood. A view of
Medicare and Social Security as partial endowment taxation has been
111
noted earlier. Another example, on a small scale, is the additional
standard deduction for the blind in the federal income tax.112 Or
consider the rule, common to the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) programs of many states, that a person must

107. Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax
Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1453–55 (2006).
108. Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions
on Recipients, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 372, 375 (1982).
109. From this perspective, the current practice of taxing cigarettes and subsidizing opera
seems to be precisely backwards.
110. Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income
Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 217, 227–28 (2002).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
112. I.R.C. § 63(c)(3) (2000).
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comply with specified work requirements as a condition of receiving
113
cash benefits, unless one is disabled. From one perspective—
admittedly not the usual one—this resembles an endowment tax on
the ability to earn a low wage, rather than no wage at all. If two
persons who do not work apply for TANF benefits, and the disabled
applicant receives benefits while the able-bodied applicant does not,
the denial of benefits to the able-bodied applicant is the equivalent of
a tax on her ability to earn a wage.
One may also imagine approaches to partial endowment taxation
not embodied in current law. Consider, as an alternative to the
privilege tax of Professors Ackerman and Alstott, a similarly tiered
tax, similarly imposed on working-age adults, but based on Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) scores achieved during high school rather than
on parental income. The necessary information would be simpler for
the taxing authorities to obtain than eighteen years’ worth of parental
income, and, given the relatively low level of tax burdens
contemplated by Ackerman and Alstott and the importance attached
to SAT scores in the college admissions process, nobody is likely to
114
take a dive on the SAT as a tax avoidance strategy. In addition, if
SAT scores depend on some combination of social privilege and
genetic endowment, a tax based on SAT scores might come closer to
a tax on overall endowment than a tax based on social privilege alone.
On the other hand, as noted above, the failure of the privilege tax to
reach genetic endowment is arguably an attraction of the privilege
tax, which would be lost if it were replaced by an SAT tax. The
privilege tax might also be superior to the SAT tax in that its reach
seems limited to aspects of true brute luck, whereas the SAT tax
would be based on some combination of brute luck and effort.
Finally, a very different sort of slouching toward endowment
taxation is suggested by Mickey Kaus’s contention that government
should seek to produce “social equality,” rather than “money
equality,” and that requiring a year of government service from every
eighteen-year-old would promote that goal by “mix[ing] the classes in

113. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320.3(b)(3)(A) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
114. James Mirrlees has suggested, rather casually, that a tax based on I.Q. scores might be
attractive for a similar reason. High I.Q. scores “may be sought after so much for prestige that
they would not often be misrepresented.” Mirrlees, supra note 17, at 208. Because the practical
advantages of a high SAT score are significantly greater than those of a high I.Q. score, in the
United States today, an SAT tax would be preferable to an I.Q. tax.
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115
a common endeavor.” Kaus does not describe his proposal in terms
of endowment taxation, but it can be viewed as an in-kind
endowment tax. Although it resembles a head tax in that it requires
an equal number of hours from each person to which it applies, it
obviously takes larger amounts of potential earnings from those with
higher wage rates. Thus, it can reasonably be understood as a
proportionate endowment tax (e.g., taking 2.5 percent of each
person’s lifetime earnings potential, on the assumption that each
person has forty working years).116

CONCLUSION
Redistribution in favor of those with bad brute luck is attractive
on both utilitarian and liberal egalitarian grounds. This has caused
some to conclude that an endowment tax, defined as a tax on
potential earnings, would be an appealing—perhaps even an ideal—
tax base, if only measurement problems could be overcome and talent
slavery could be avoided. It is somewhat surprising, however, that
potential earnings has been so readily accepted as an adequate
measure of brute luck or endowment, when people’s luck differs in so
many ways not captured by the measurement of potential earnings. It
does not follow, however, from the inadequacy of potential earnings
as a full measure of endowment, that a stand-alone income tax is the
best that can be done by way of redistributing with respect to
differences in brute luck. Various steps in an endowment tax
direction—including insurance nondiscrimination rules, taxation of
“social privilege,” and even taxation on the basis of SAT scores—may
be both feasible and desirable complements to income taxation. If the
endowment tax discussion can break free of the assumption that the
ultimate measure of endowment is potential earnings, endowment tax
thinking may have—and may deserve to have—considerable
influence on tax-and-transfer policy.
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116. The idea of in-kind endowment taxation could be taken in other directions as well. For
example, a person with high earnings potential who chooses to work at a low paying job
producing clear social benefits—such as a public school teacher—might be considered to have
satisfied some or all of her obligation under an endowment tax in kind, whereas an equally
talented person earning an equally low wage job bereft of social benefits would not have
satisfied any of her tax obligation in kind. However, identifying the jobs producing sufficient
social benefits would be a daunting—perhaps impossible—task.

